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Abstract
Does the Early Warning System alert the European Commission about the prospects of
passing new policy? We present a model of European Union policymaking in which the
Early Warning System plays an important signalling role. In our model, the Commission
uses signals from the Early Warning System to update its belief about governments’
voting strategies in the Council. The Commission may then anticipate difficult negotia-
tions by withdrawing its proposal early. We find empirical evidence for our theory:
(1) reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments strongly predict opposition
from their governments and (2) the Commission is more likely to withdraw proposals
that receive reasoned opinions, even in the absence of a yellow card. Our results run
counter to the dominant view in the literature that the Early Warning System is not a
very relevant aspect of EU decision-making. Instead, reasoned opinions constitute a
clear signal that negotiations are more likely to fail.
Keywords
Early Warning System, EU policymaking, political institutions, signalling, voting
Corresponding author:










Does the Early Warning System (EWS) alert the European Commission about the
prospects of passing policy in the European Union (EU)? The answer to this
question touches upon the core of political economists’ research agendas: How
do political institutions work? The EWS is a political institution of which the
performance is arguably not clear cut. Yet, it appears prominently in current
debates in the EU.
Proposals to reform the EWS circulate regularly, with recent suggestions for
green and red cards, next to the already existing yellow and orange card system.
The EWS is also likely to feature on the agenda of the upcoming Conference on the
Future of Europe, that is to be held within the next two years. Understanding how
the EWS works, and any impact it may have on policymaking is thus fundamental
to judge whether institutional reform is warranted.
The EWS, introduced with the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, had the objec-
tive to increase the EU’s legitimacy by strengthening the role of national parlia-
ments (NPs) and allowing them to directly intervene in EU policymaking. It allows
NPs to raise objections to legislative proposals submitted by the European
Commission if they believe the draft proposal violates the principle of subsidiarity.
They can do this up to eight weeks after receipt of the Commission’s proposal. If
enough NPs raise such objections in the form of reasoned opinions (ROs), a
‘yellow card’ is triggered, and the Commission is formally obliged to reconsider
its proposal.1
At first glance, both logic and anecdotal evidence seem to suggest that the EWS
fell short of increasing parliaments’ power. Nor does it appear to have a consid-
erable impact on EU policymaking more broadly, perhaps aside from increasing
parliaments’ awareness of EU affairs (Miklin, 2017). For instance, parliaments
only submit ROs sporadically, resulting in isolated occurrences of objections,
which are likely not to matter much. Moreover, even if parliaments succeed in
collectively submitting ROs, the impact is questionable, as the yellow card against
the Posted Workers Directive demonstrated. Apart from the fact that this yellow
card was only the third such instance since the EWS’s introduction, the
Commission – undeterred by the yellow card – simply decided to proceed with
the legislative process. So not only do individual ROs seem to have little impact,
neither does a collective yellow card.
The picture sketched above of the EWS as irrelevant is misleading. Not merely
because systematic empirical analysis is lacking, but primarily because the EWS
has a role that has not been considered thus far: it provides information. In this
regard, it may provide an important signal to a variety of actors about bargaining
difficulties that will arise later during negotiations in the Council, the EU’s most
important legislative institution, but also infamous for its lack of transparency.
In this article, we present a simple model of EU policymaking in which the EWS
may serve as a signal to the European Commission. The Commission, uncertain
about how governments will vote in the Council, can resolve part of this
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uncertainty through the EWS. Anticipating difficult negotiations, the Commission
may decide to withdraw its proposal, because it believes that the proposal will fail
anyway or because it is likely to be amended far away from its ideal preferences.
Our model results in two key questions that we put to an empirical test. First,
are ROs by parliaments a good predictor of their governments’ voting behaviour?
In other words, do they signal that negotiations in the Council will be challenging?
After all, governments in the Council are accountable to those same parliaments
that may record ROs in the first place. Second, if they do indeed allow the
Commission to update its belief, does it respond to these signals by withdrawing
proposals altogether?
To test these questions empirically, we constructed a unique dataset in which we
match all ROs submitted by NPs at the start of the legislative process with the
votes and formal policy statements from their cabinet governments in the EU
Council at the end of the process. Based on more than 400 matched proposals
initiated by the European Commission between January 2010 and December 2013,
we find evidence for a significant and positive relation between ROs and negative
votes.2 More specifically, when an NP has issued an RO on a legislative proposal,
its cabinet government is, on average, five times more likely to oppose that same
proposal during Council negotiations. Importantly, the magnitude of this relation
merely constitutes a lower bound, because controversial proposals may never be
voted on in the Council. ROs early in the decision-making process are thus a
strong predictor of bargaining difficulties at later stages.
In addition, we find that the Commission is not unaware of this signal nor
ignorant of its meaning. Proposals that receive ROs have a higher probability of
being withdrawn, even in the absence of a yellow card. Furthermore, we show that
the Commission makes a rational cost-benefit calculation: given its belief, the
Commission is more likely to withdraw if the proposal is not very salient (low
benefits) and the costs of policy adoption are high.
Our results have a number of important implications for EU policymaking.
First, the EWS has more general value than has been considered so far. In partic-
ular, it has an important informational value. From this perspective, we could
consider the EWS as a tool similar to the United States (US) Senate’s ‘Hold’
and the US House of Representatives’ ‘Motion to recommit with instructions’.3
All three procedures give a decentralized entity – an NP in case of the EWS – a way
to signal-specific concerns that are important to its members. Such a signal may
also have value to the receiver if leaving the signalled concerns unaddressed would
eventually cause the receiver harm. In our model, policymaking is costly for the
Commission. As such, it benefits from extra information if this may lead to the
conservation of scarce resources and precious negotiating time. This, in turn, may
lead to an increase in decision-making efficiency and can partly explain why the
Commission has been willing to grant more powers to NPs.4
Second, while this article focusses on the informational value for the
Commission, it has implications for a variety of other actors that have an interest
in EU policy. Whether it be other EU institutions such as the European Parliament
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(EP) or policymakers, interest groups and voters more broadly. For instance, like
the Commission, interest groups can assess how likely it is that a proposal will pass
and organize their lobbying activities accordingly. Similarly, ROs may arguably
allow voters to infer the position of their governments in Council negotiations.
Third, our results are important for research on decision-making in the Council
of the EU. The Council is still an opaque institution. Member state governments
are well-known to hide their policy preferences for a variety of reasons. ROs from
NPs can then provide an alternative source of information for scholars who have
made it their primary objective to unravel parts of this black box.
Related literature
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced several novelties into the legislative process of the
EU. Arguably, the most significant reform has been the introduction of the EWS.
It allows NPs to intervene directly in EU policymaking in the form of ROs against
draft legislative proposals initiated by the European Commission. Parliaments
send these opinions, at least in theory, to defend the principle of subsidiarity
and to actively engage in the EU’s policymaking process. In practice, however,
objections go beyond the subsidiarity principle and may as well express a diver-
gence of policy preferences (see for example, Jancic, 2015). Objections of the latter
kind are then simply ‘disguised’ as subsidiarity complaints. Either way, if enough
parliaments submit ROs, a yellow card is triggered, and the Commission is for-
mally obliged to reconsider its proposal.
To date, most scholarly attention has focused on explaining the variation
between parliaments’ decisions to submit ROs. For an excellent overview of this
literature, we refer to Gattermann and Hefftler (2015), Williams (2016), Malang
et al. (2017) and Huysmans (2018). Contrary to explaining the variation between
parliaments’ use of ROs, we are primarily interested in their impact for EU policy-
making more broadly.
One way ROs may have an impact is by acting as a signal for opposition in the
Council. In a case study on the Monti II regulation, Cooper (2015) found that
parliaments that submitted an RO also appeared to instruct their governments to
vote against the Monti II proposal in the Council. A similar argument has recently
been made by Rasmussen and Dionigi (2018). They studied the actual content of
parliamentary opinions to the Commission and found anecdotal evidence that
some parliaments explicitly include in their submitted opinion a message to their
government, such as ‘we call upon the government to register its disagreement with
the proposals’ (Rasmussen and Dionigi, 2018).
These findings are also in line with the conclusions drawn from a slightly dif-
ferent research domain. In the field of Council decision-making, van Gruisen and
Crombez (2019) and Hagemann et al. (2019) have shown that governments are
more likely to oppose legislation if their parliament strictly controls them. Van
Gruisen and Crombez (2019) find that this is all the more the case when
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parliaments are Eurosceptic and have the power to provide parliamentary man-
dates to their ministers on how to vote on Commission proposals.
Thus, if parliaments submit ROs to oppose EU legislation and subsequently
instruct their governments to do the same in Council negotiations, this could be an
important argument that ROs carry valuable information as well as have a causal
effect on government votes. Moreover, even if parliaments lack the power to
instruct their governments how to vote, as is arguably the case for ‘weak’ parlia-
ments, the fact that they are likely to hold similar policy preferences is another
argument that ROs convey valuable information. This is especially true for parlia-
ments of majority governments. As a result, ROs may provide a lot of information
about how governments are likely to vote, whether it be because parliaments
instruct their governments or simply because parliaments and governments may
have similar preferences.
Other actors that have an interest in EU policy may then benefit from this
information. One such actor is the European Commission. Upon observing
these opinions, the Commission may anticipate difficult negotiations in the
Council and decide to withdraw its proposal. Studying a limited selection of pro-
posals that received most ROs, Cooper (2018) finds that NPs had at least some
influence on the final outcome in these instances. What the underlying reason is for
influence remains unclear, however.
In contrast, in this article, we present a formal theory that explains why the
Commission is more likely to withdraw proposals as a function of the number of
ROs. Our findings stress the importance of the EWS in updating the Commission’s
information.
The informational value of ROs
Model set-up
In this section, we introduce a simple model of EU policymaking. The objective is
to study the Commission’s decision to proceed or end the legislative process as a
function of submitted ROs by NPs. The intuition is that the more ROs, the less
likely the proposal is to pass in the Council. The model focuses on the informa-
tional value of ROs for the Commission. The complicated two-way interaction
between NPs and governments is not modelled in detail; reduced form parameters
are used instead. Note that we use ‘RO’ and ‘opinion’ in this section interchange-
ably to avoid repetition.
We study EU policymaking as a process between the Commission on the one
hand and 28 NPs and their governments on the other. For simplicity and given the
focus of this examination, we disregard the role of the EP. Taking the EP into
account would complicate matters without affecting our main conclusions.5
The Commission is the EU’s formal agenda-setter. Implicitly, we assume a
spatial model where the Commission has Euclidean preferences, that is, it consid-
ers proposing a new policy whenever it anticipates the new policy to be closer to its
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ideal policy than the status quo. Because not all policies are equally important, we
assume the Commission’s utility from new policy relative to the status quo depends
on the salience d  0 it attaches to the policy. For instance, policies on migration
issues are arguably more important than proposals that deal with institutional
formalities. For ease of reference, a summary of the notation is presented in the
Online appendix.
Relative to the status quo, the new policy entails a higher utility, but also a
policy-adoption cost c > 0: This cost can be defined broadly and may refer to time
and resources spent; for example, in monitoring Council negotiations or the oppor-
tunity cost of working on other legislative issues. Similarly, they may entail poten-
tial costs from non-implementation, such as legitimacy costs or monitoring costs
during the implementation afterwards.
In line with Boranbay-Akan et al. (2017), we assume that the Commission is an
imperfect agenda-setter. While the Commission holds consultations during the
drafting stage, these are unlikely to give it perfect information. Similarly,
Crombez and Vangerven (2014) and Høyland and Hansen (2014) argue that the
Commission does not have perfect information regarding the distribution of pref-
erences in the Council. K€onig and Proksch (2006) refer to the Commission as an
agenda-setter that has ‘imperfect drafting information’. In our analysis, we assume
that the Commission has some prior belief about the preferences of the govern-
ments but is not entirely certain. As such, the EWS may help the Commission
partially resolve the remaining uncertainty.
Although the Commission is uncertain whether its proposal will be adopted, it
does know the probability distribution of governments’ votes and thus has a prior
belief p that the proposal will pass. The Commission’s ex-ante expected utility
from proposing a new policy can then be formulated as
E½Upropose ¼ p d cð Þ þ 1 pð Þ cð Þ ¼ pd c (1)
where p is the probability that the proposal gets adopted, d is the benefit from the
new proposal, c is the policy-adoption cost as outlined above, and ð1 pÞ is the
probability that the proposal gets rejected. Hence the Commission will propose new
policy if and only if pd c  0, assuming it will still propose when indifferent.6
The national governments also care about policy. If brought to vote, the gov-
ernments i 2 f1; . . . ; ng can vote in favour ðvi ¼ 1Þ or against ðvi ¼ 0Þ in the
Council. The ex-ante probability of a vote in favour is pi, of a vote against
1 pi. For simplicity, we assume that the votes of the governments have identical
and independent distributions, with the probability p of being in favour for any
given government. The number of votes in favour V ¼ Pivi then follows a bino-
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In the absence of the EWS, the policymaking process is straightforward: (1) the
Commission proposes policy; (2) the governments vote either in favour (vi ¼ 1) or
against ðvi ¼ 0Þ. If enough governments vote in favour, the proposal becomes law;
if not, the status quo prevails.
Under the assumptions made, calculating the prior probability of adoption p is
straightforward. Under unanimity (UN), the probability of reaching unanimous
agreement n is
pUN ¼ Pr UNð Þ ¼ Pr V ¼ nð Þ ¼ pn (2)
Under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), the probability of obtaining a QM
q is







The process is slightly more complex with the introduction of the EWS. In
particular, the EWS adds two more stages to the process: (1) the Commission
proposes policy; (2) the Commission observes any ROs sent by NPs; (3) the
Commission can withdraw the policy or proceed with the process, but if the
Commission withdraws the policy, it avoids the policy-adoption costs c and
the process ends; (4) the governments either vote in favour (vi ¼ 1) or against
the policy ðvi ¼ 0Þ.
Like governments, parliaments may be either in favour of or opposed to the new
policy. We assume that if they are opposed, they issue an opinion (ROi ¼ 1Þ. If
they are in favour, they do not issue an opinion (ROi ¼ 0). Denote the total
number of ROs 2 f0; . . . ; ng as R ¼ PiROi.
The real-world interaction between governments and parliaments is complicat-
ed. The baseline expectation is that governments and parliaments have relatively
similar preferences, since government coalitions typically require a majority in the
parliament. This observation leads to the expectation of a (mere) correlation
between government votes and parliament ROs. Yet, there may be two-way stra-
tegic interactions, making part of the correlation causal. On the one hand, parlia-
ments may use ROs to try to commit their governments to voting a certain way in
the Council; some parliaments even have formal mandating rights to guarantee
this (Winzen, 2012). On the other hand, governments may encourage their parlia-
ments to submit opinions to have a scapegoat to point at when they voice oppo-
sition in the Council. This is similar to Putnam’s (1988) domestic constraint
argument in two-level games and may especially be the case for majority govern-
ments (Auel and Neuhold, 2017).
Regardless of how this game between parliaments and their governments is
played, what matters is the final correlation between opinions and votes. Hence,
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we leave more sophisticated models for future research and take a reduced form
approach to this interaction instead.
Furthermore, we assume that governments and parliaments are truthful rather
than strategic vis-à-vis the Commission; they simply issue an opinion or vote ‘no’ if
they dislike the policy.7 There may be reasons for parliaments and governments to
strategically fake opposition occasionally, but the low numbers of opinions by
parliaments and opposition in the Council clearly show that incentives for such
strategic behaviour are limited.
Now, a reduced-form model of the interaction between governments
and parliaments requires only two parameters. On the one hand, define ai ¼
PrðROi ¼ 1jvi ¼ 1Þ as the probability of the parliament issuing an opinion while
the government votes in favour of the new policy. For example, this may reflect a
situation where the parliament’s opinion, in not wanting the policy, reflects a slightly
different preference from the government – a situation that seems more likely with
minority governments. On the other hand, define bi ¼ PrðROi ¼ 0jvi ¼ 0Þ as the
probability of the parliament not issuing an opinion while the government votes
against the policy. For example, this may simply reflect a situation, where the par-
liament lacked the time to submit an RO within the eight-week deadline.
The complements of these parameters give the remaining two possibilities: 1
ai ¼ PrðROi ¼ 0jvi ¼ 1Þ is the probability of the parliament not issuing an opinion
while the government votes in favour; empirically by far the most common sce-
nario. Conversely, 1 bi ¼ PrðROi ¼ 1jvi ¼ 0Þ is the probability of the parliament
issuing an RO while the government votes against. While ai and bi may differ from
country to country, for tractability and ease of exposition, we assume ai ¼ a and
bi ¼ b for all countries. In a more complicated model, opinions from countries
with higher values of a and b would have lower informational value for the
Commission. In the real world, this means that the Commission should pay less
attention to opinions from countries where the government often votes in favour
anyway after an RO and vice versa. This feature also explains why there is likely
limited incentive for strategic ROs aimed at making the Commission withdraw a
proposal that the government would not vote against: the more countries did this,
the less it would work.
For information to be contained in opinions, it has to be the case that 1 b > a,
which as the Online appendix shows, is equivalent to the following testable hypothesis:
H1: The probability that the government opposes a proposal is higher conditional on
an RO by its parliament.
ROs and the Commission’s equilibrium strategy
We solve the decision-theoretic model by choosing the Commission’s strategy
s 2 withdraw; proceedf g, such that its expected utility is maximized, conditional
on the updated belief through the EWS.
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The Commission, when proposing policy in stage 1, looks ahead. In the final
stage (stage 4), the governments vote on the proposal. In the preceding stage
(stage 3), the Commission has to decide whether to withdraw its proposal or to
move it to a vote in stage 4. While withdrawing leads to a certain payoff of zero,
putting the proposal to a vote comes with uncertain payoffs, depending on govern-
ments’ votes.
Note that, at this point, the Commission has more information about the
expected government votes compared to when it proposed its policy in stage 1.
Having observed in stage 2 which parliaments (if any) submitted ROs, and using
the historically inferred parameters a and b, the Commission can derive a posterior
probability n of the policy passing. Note that in our simplified model, all countries
are ex-ante identical, so that only the total number of opinions and votes matters.
By applying Bayes’ theorem, having observed r ROs, the posterior probability n
of the policy passing under UN and QM is
nUN ¼ Pr UNjR ¼ rð Þ ¼
Pr UN⋂R ¼ rð Þ
Pr R ¼ rð Þ ¼
Pr V ¼ nð ÞPrðR ¼ rjV ¼ nÞP
v Pr V ¼ vð ÞPr R ¼ rjV ¼ vð Þ
  (4)
nQM ¼ Pr QMjR ¼ rð Þ ¼
PrðQM⋂R ¼ rÞ
PrðR ¼ rÞ ¼
Pn
t¼q
Pr V ¼ tð ÞPr R ¼ rjV ¼ tð Þ 
P
v Pr V ¼ vð ÞPr R ¼ rjV ¼ vð Þ
 
(5)
The conditional probabilities PrðR ¼ rjV ¼ vÞ in these expressions can be cal-
culated using the parameters a and b. The r ROs have to be issued by either
parliaments of governments in favour or against
Pr R ¼ rjV ¼ vð Þ ¼
Xmin v;rf g
i ¼ max




ai 1 að Þvi n v
r i
 
bnvrþi 1 bð Þri (6)
More details on the derivation are provided in the Online appendix. By taking
the observed parameters p; a, and b from our data, a calibrated version of this
model can easily be visualized. In order to improve the level of realism, we esti-
mated the parameters separately for UN and QM – the parameter values can be
found in the Online appendix. The main difference is that governments are more
likely to vote in favour under UN. For QM, we assumed a minimum de jure
threshold of two-thirds of countries, i.e. q ¼ 19 out of 28. Taking into account
the culture of consensus in the Council (Heisenberg, 2005), we also simulated the
model for the potential higher de facto thresholds. The calibrated model of the
posterior probability of passing n is shown in Figure 1. The Commission’s
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posterior belief n that the proposal will pass is decreasing in the number of opin-
ions that it observes. The higher the required threshold for adoption, the stronger
the effect of an RO.
Based on its updated belief n, the Commission can now decide to proceed with
the legislative process or to withdraw its proposal. The expected utility from con-
tinuing with the legislative process based on the posterior belief is
now n d cð Þ þ 1 nð Þ cð Þ ¼ nd c. Since the Commission’s utility from with-
drawing is zero, its optimal strategy is to withdraw the proposal if and only if 0 >
nd c or, equivalently, if and only if
E Uwithdraw½  ¼ ndþ c > 0 (7)
The logic of the above inequality is intuitive. Upon receiving an RO, the
Commission is more likely to withdraw the proposal ðaÞ the lower the posterior
probability of passing n, ðbÞ the lower the salience d and ðcÞ the higher the costs of
policy-adoption c. The posterior probability of passing n in turn depends on the
number of opinions and the parameters a and b: the more opinions, the more
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Figure 1. Posterior probability of policy passing n as a function of r ROs, for different decision
thresholds.
Note: The calibrated model illustrates how the Commission may update its belief on observing r number of
ROs. The curves reflect different majority thresholds. The estimates of n are later used in the empirical
analysis of Commission withdrawals. For the analysis, we use UN and QM_26 thresholds.
QM: qualified majority; ROs: reasoned opinions; UN: unanimity.
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when the government is actually in favour and the smaller the probability b of no
RO when the government is actually opposed. We can rephrase these findings in
terms of withdrawing the proposal:
H2a: The probability that the Commission withdraws its proposal decreases with the
posterior probability of passing, and hence increases with the number of ROs.
If the Commission cares strongly about a proposal, i.e. the proposal has high
salience, the Commission may opt not to withdraw it, even if the posterior prob-
ability of passing is low. When the stakes are high, taking the risk of not passing
may be worth it.
H2b: The Commission is less likely to withdraw proposals of high salience, even if the
posterior probability of passing is low.
Finally, the higher the policy-adoption costs, the more likely the Commission is to
withdraw. Such costs may capture, for instance, the decision-making rule in the
Council. Proposals under the UN rule may be considered to be more costly com-
pared to those under a QM, because they require every member state’s consent and
hence more effort to produce a consensus.
H2c: The Commission is more likely to withdraw proposals with high policy-adoption
costs.
Empirics: ROs and information
Data and methodology
Do ROs indeed predict opposition in the Council? While our theoretical simula-
tion, based on the parameters a and b from our data, suggests that it does, so far
these have been mere correlations between ROs by parliaments and opposing votes
by governments.
It may very well be that the submission of an RO is correlated with a number of
other factors that affect governments’ voting behaviour and thus would confound
this relationship. For example, parliaments may send ROs more often on issues
that require QMV, as these legislative proposals often involve competencies that
are transferred from the national to the EU-level. Studies on Council decision-
making in turn have shown that governments are more likely to oppose proposals
under QMV (for example, Bailer et al., 2015). Hence, to isolate the relation
between voting behaviour and ROs, we must account for such confounding factors
with more rigorous analyses.
To that effect, we run a series of regressions. The dependent variable government
opposition takes a value of 1 if a government has opposed a proposal in the Council
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by either a ‘no’-vote, an abstention or a negative statement and a value of 0 if the
government voted in favour.8
Our key independent variable captures whether an NP has submitted an RO. To
collect these data, we matched every RO on legislative acts introduced under the
EWS between January 2010 and December 2013 with the formal votes and policy
statements of the governments in the Council.9 The variable RO takes a value of 1
if a parliament submitted an RO on a particular proposal and zero otherwise. In
the case of bicameral parliaments, we considered an RO only if issued by the
parliament’s lower chamber as the government is ultimately accountable to the
lower house. In the Online appendix, we redo this exercise with a measure that also
takes into account ROs issued by upper chambers, with similar results.
Our dataset includes 372 matched proposals. This gives us 10,044 observations
of proposal-country dyads representing 27 member states (Croatia only joined in
2013). Note that votes on withdrawn proposals are not available and could not be
matched with the ROs from parliaments. As a result, the estimates we obtain
regarding the relation between ROs and government opposition are merely lower
bounds on their true relation.
As mentioned previously, we want to isolate the effect of ROs. As such, we
control for a number of proposal characteristics, parliament characteristics
and government characteristics. The description and coding of the control
variables can be found in the Online appendix. One variable to highlight concerns
parliaments’ political dialogue contributions (PDCs). In addition to submitting
an RO, parliaments may also submit a PDC to the European
Commission. These opinions do not deal with the subsidiarity principle nor do
they require a formal reaction from the Commission, as the yellow card does.
These opinions are broader and are primarily used to engage in dialogue.
Nonetheless, parliaments may also communicate any complaints by submitting
such a contribution.
Apart from the control variables introduced above, two other issues are
present. Votes on proposals are not entirely independent, and some countries
may simply issue more ROs and more opposing votes. We account for this
by clustering the standard errors at the proposal level and introduce fixed effects
for member states and years. In the most robust model, we include country
and year fixed effects as well as their interaction. Such interaction may capture,
for instance, a change of the government in office. Our main probit model is
as follows
Prðvi;k ¼ 1Þ ¼ Uðaþ bROi;k þ c0X þ li þ ktÞ (8)
where Prðvi;k ¼ 1Þ is the probability that the government of member state i opposes
legislation k; U is the cumulative normal distribution function; ROi;k is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the parliament of member state i has issued an RO on
legislation k; X is a vector of control variables that include proposal, parliament
12 European Union Politics 0(0)
and government characteristics. Finally, li and kt capture country and year-fixed
effects, respectively.
Results
Do ROs by parliaments signal opposition by their respective governments in
Council negotiations? Table 1 presents the results of the regression analyses. We
gradually build our model to more robust specifications. We find that the likeli-
hood that a government opposes Commission proposals is indeed significantly
higher with the issuance of an RO from the parliament. This result is robust to
various model specifications (Models 1–4). ROs are thus a credible signal of gov-
ernment opposition, consistent with hypothesis 1. Full regression tables can be
found in the Online appendix.
To give a more substantial interpretation of our estimates, we plot the predicted
probability of opposing legislation in the Council conditional on an RO in
Figure 2. In addition, we contrast the effect of ROs with the effect of contributions
under the political dialogue system. Our results show that the latter are also pos-
itively related to opposing votes, albeit with a less significant effect in both statis-
tical and substantive terms. Figure 2 clearly illustrates that an RO is a far better
predictor of opposing votes than are PDCs. With an RO, the probability of oppo-
sition in the Council goes up more than fivefold from 3 to 16%. This estimate is
based on the most robust model, Model 4. As previously stated, this is merely a
lower bound of the true relation.
Table 1. Reasoned opinions by parliaments and opposing votes by their governments.
Key results
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Reasoned opinion (RO) 0.91 (0.18)*** 0.80 (0.16)*** 0.88 (0.17)*** 0.98 (0.18)***
PDC 0.15 (0.07)** 0.28 (0.09)*** 0.31 (0.10)***
Constant –1.71 (0.04)*** –2.97 (0.19)*** –2.59 (0.24)*** –2.28 (0.86)***
Vector of control variables –   
FE (country) – –  
FE (year) – –  
FE (country year) – – – 
Observations 10,044 10,044 10,044 8,051
Matched proposals 372 372 372 372
Member States 27 27 27 27
Note: Results for 372 matched proposals for the period 2010–2013. Dependent variable: government
opposition (‘no’-vote, abstention, or negative statement). Probit regression. Standard errors in parentheses:
**, and *** denote significance at the 5, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
proposal level. The set of control variables include parliamentary strength (Winzen, 2012), Trio Presidency (van
Gruisen et al., 2019), voting rule, legislative instrument, and opposition by other member states (Arregui and
Thomson, 2014).
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Now that we are more confident that ROs provide information, we can proceed
to study whether this has any implications for the Commission’s decision to with-
draw its proposals.
Empirics: Updated information and withdrawal
Data and methodology
The previous section showed that ROs provide credible information on the likeli-
hood of opposition in the Council. Then, according to our expected utility model
E½Uwithdraw, the posterior probability of passing, together with proposal salience
and policy adoption costs, determines the Commission’s utility.
While the Commission’s utility from withdrawing is unobserved, it can be seen
as the latent variable driving the decision to withdraw. According to our formal
model, the Commission’s equilibrium strategy is
Y ¼ withdrawð Þ ¼











































political dialogue contribution by parliament?
Figure 2. Predicted probability of opposition in the Council.
Note: The left Figure shows predicted probability of an opposing vote (‘no’, ‘abstention’, or ‘negative state-
ment’) in Council negotiations conditional on the national parliament submitting an RO at the start of the
process. The probability that the government will oppose legislation after the issuance of an RO by its
parliament is more than five times as high compared to when the parliament has not submitted an RO. The
right figure shows the predicted probability of an opposing vote conditional on a contribution under the
political dialogue. The predicted probabilities are calculated at specific values for the control variables such as
a majority government that is not part of a Trio Presidency and that votes on a Directive by QM. The effect is
qualitatively similar if we use the mean values approach.
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Now, assuming an unobserved error e with standard normal distribution and
cumulative density function UðeÞ, this leads to the following probit model
Pr withdraw ¼ 1jn; d; cð Þ ¼ Pr E Uwithdraw½  þ e > 0ð Þ (10)
which, adding some further controls, can be written as
Prðwk ¼ 1Þ ¼ Uðb0 þ b1nþ b2dþ b3cþ c0X þ kt þ hkÞ (11)
where Prðwk ¼ 1Þ is the probability that the Commission withdraws the kth pro-
posal. n is the Commission’s updated belief as calculated by the posterior proba-
bility of the policy passing. We expect a higher posterior belief to have a negative
effect on Commission withdrawal ðb1 < 0Þ. Similarly, salient proposals, d, are less
likely to be withdrawn ðb2 < 0Þ, while the higher is the cost of policymaking c, the
more likely the Commission is to withdraw ðb3 > 0Þ. Finally, X is the control
variable of the aggregated number of PDCs, whereas kt and hk capture year and
policy area-fixed effects, respectively. The latter can be considered as a control
variable for preference heterogeneity either between years or between topics.
The dependent variable withdraw is coded as 1 if the proposal is withdrawn and
0 otherwise. We obtained the Commission’s decisions to withdraw from EUR-
Lex.10 Our data include 424 legislative proposals that were introduced between
January 2010 and December 2013.
For the Commission’s posterior n, we use the estimates calculated in the theory
section based on the de facto QM threshold in the main analysis. The variable n
ranges from 0 (the Commission is certain the policy will not pass) to 0.86 (the
Commission has a strong belief the policy will pass). While this theoretically derived
measure is preferred to simply using the aggregated number of observed ROs, it has
the disadvantage that it already includes the decision rule, which we also use as a
proxy for policy adoption costs. For that reason, we estimate two sets of regressions.
In the first two models, we use n. In the two later models, we replace n with the
aggregated number of ROs on issue k,
Pn
i ROi;k. This allows us to illustrate the effect
of high policymaking costs (UN) and low policymaking costs (QMV) separately.
We proxy salience d based on a recent suggestion by Blom-Hansen and Finke
(2020). They argue that directives are usually considered more salient to the
Commission than are regulations and decisions. Hence, we code d ¼ 1 if the pro-
posed policy is a directive and 0 otherwise. As a robustness check, we use the
logarithm of the number of recitals on each proposal as a proxy for salience.
For the policy adoption costs, we use the distinction between UN and QMV in
the Council. It seems natural to assume that getting all governments on board is
more difficult (costly) than a QM. Hence our variable policy adoption costs¼ 1 if
the voting rule is UN and zero otherwise. In the Online appendix, we redo the
exercise with the size of the gridlock interval as a measure of policy adoption costs,
with similar findings.
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Results
The results are reported in Table 2. We first use our preferred measure for poste-
rior belief n. Remember that this measure links ROs in a more theoretically sound
manner to a posterior belief. As shown in Models 1 and 2, a higher posterior belief
on policy passing leads to a smaller probability of withdrawing, in line with
hypothesis 2a. Likewise, the Commission is less likely to withdraw if the proposal
is salient. This is in line with hypothesis 2b. The lack of a statistically significant
effect for policy adoption costs is due to the fact that this is already picked-up by
the posterior variable. For that reason, we turn to the second set of regressions.
In Model 3 and 4, we use the aggregate number of ROs directly in the model.
We find that the more ROs, the more likely the Commission is to withdraw. Now,
the variable policy adoption cost is significant and positive. In other words, the
higher the cost of proceeding with the proposal, the lower the Commission’s
expected utility, and thus the higher the likelihood, it will withdraw instead.
This is in line with hypothesis 2c. Finally, in Model 5, we find an interaction
effect between the number of ROs and voting rule in the Council, as referred to
in the table as policy adoption costs. We do not find a significant interaction effect
with salience, although the direction is in line with what one would expect.
Interestingly, in all models, we do not find any evidence that more PDCs lead to
a higher probability that the Commission will withdraw a proposal. ROs thus seem
to capture specific information that are not captured by PDCs.
The predicted probabilities for all variables are plotted in Figure 3(a); the higher
the Commission’s posterior belief that the proposal will pass, the lower the prob-
ability that it withdraws. Moreover, for any given belief, the Commission is more
Table 2. The determinants of policy withdrawal.
Direct measure: posterior¼ n Indirect measure: posterior ¼ Pni ROi;k
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Posterior ðnÞ –3.56 (1.07)*** –4.24 (1.15)*** 0.27 (0.08)*** 0.28 (0.08)*** 0.23 (0.12)*
Salience ðdÞ –0.45 (0.22)** –0.48 (0.26)* –0.49 (0.22)** –0.53 (0.26)** –0.47 (0.30)
Policy adoption cost ðcÞ –0.20 (0.43) –0.12 (0.47) 0.86 (0.26)*** 1.08 (0.31)*** 0.82 (0.35)**
PDC 0.02(0.05) 0.05 (0.06) 0.02 (0.05) 0.04(0.06) 0.04 (0.06)
Posterior x ðcÞ – – – – 0.73 (0.36)**
Posterior x ðdÞ – – – – –0.06 (0.18)
constant 1.61 (0.96)* 1.79 (1.16) –1.50 (0.17)*** –1.98(0.54)*** –1.86 (0.53)***
FE topic –  –  
FE year –  –  
Observations 424 381 424 381 381
Note: Dependent variable: withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission. Results for 424 proposals intro-
duced in the period 2010–2013. Probit regression. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level,
respectively.
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likely to withdraw if the proposal is not very salient (b) and if the cost of getting the
proposal through the policy process is high (c).
Although we have shown that the Commission does indeed have a higher like-
lihood of withdrawing in cases where the prospects of success are low, we cannot
explicitly distinguish between early and late withdrawal. In other words, we cannot
assess whether the Commission withdraws a proposal early because of ROs or
because of a lack of support in the Council. The data on withdrawals are released
in batches and are not informative as to when the Commission actually withdraws
a proposal. Below, we present a number of arguments in favour of our theory, and
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Figure 3. Predicted probability of withdrawal.
Note: The figure shows the predicted probability of the Commission withdrawing a proposal: (a) predicted
probability on withdrawing conditional on the posterior n; (b) probability on withdrawal for salient versus less
salient proposal; and (c) probability on withdrawing depending on the decision rule in the Council (high policy
adoption costs¼UN voting).
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First, the yellow card on the Monti II regulations provides some empirical
evidence for our argument that the Commission may withdraw a proposal early
in response to ROs. In particular, when the EU Commission received the yellow
card against the Monti II Regulation, a regulation concerning the right to strike, it
subsequently withdrew the proposal. The Commission explicitly stated that a
breach of the subsidiarity principle was not evident in the parliamentary opinions.
Rather, the proposal was withdrawn because it was ‘unlikely to gather the neces-
sary political support within the EP and the Council to enable adoption’
(European Commission, 2013).
Second, the Commission is only allowed to formally withdraw its proposal as
long as the Council has not acted (Article 293(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union). Thus, in order to avoid that the Council and EP adopt a pro-
posal that differs significantly from the original proposal, the Commission has a
strong incentive to strategically anticipate such events and timely withdraw its
proposal.
Third, regardless how responsive to ROs the Commission is in reality, we have
shown that the Commission is much more likely to ultimately withdraw proposals
that receive ROs. So, either the Commission already makes use of the signal, as the
Monti II proposal arguably indicates, or it should consider making more use of it
to avoid wasting time on proposals that it does not find sufficiently important.
Finally, the Commission is clearly not the only actor that benefits from the
signalling value of ROs. Given that the Council is by far the most non-
transparent institution, the EP, but also policy-makers and other interest
groups, may use ROs from parliaments to improve their information on the like-
lihood of policy success.
Conclusion
Intuitively, the EWS may not have been very successful. This intuition has largely
been fueled by the low number of yellow cards, only three to date. These have
often taken a central position in recent research about the merits and demerits of
the EWS. This article challenges this intuition. We provide an alternative theory
that shows how the EWS could be considered a useful institutional innovation.
Contrary to the approach that treats the EWS as a failed mechanism to veto EU
legislation, we consider it as a signalling device to the European Commission and
other actors that, in a broader context, is similar to other institutional signalling
mechanisms in the US.
We present a simple model of EU policymaking. In the model, the EWS can be
a credible predictor of how governments will vote in the Council. The EU
Commission, as a rational actor, takes these signals into account when deciding
to proceed with the legislative process or to withdraw the proposal altogether. We
show that if the signal is sufficiently accurate, the salience of the proposal is low
and the costs of policymaking are high, then the Commission optimally withdraws
the proposal when it receives ROs. Our model can provide an explanation for the
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Posted Workers Directive which triggered the third yellow card but was ultimately
not withdrawn by the Commission: on the one hand, the yellow card provided a
strong signal that negotiations in the Council would be difficult (many ROs). On
the other hand, the proposal was of high salience (directive) and the costs of policy
adoption were relatively low (QMV), making the expected utility from not with-
drawing the proposal arguably positive.
Our empirical analysis of all legislative proposals submitted under the EWS
between 2010 and 2013 supports this theory. We estimate a lower bound of the
true relation between parliaments’ ROs and their government’s opposition in
Council negotiations. We find that, on average, governments for which the parlia-
ment has submitted an RO are five times more likely to oppose that same piece of
legislation in the Council. Hence, ROs are a credible signal of government opposi-
tion in the Council. This may either be a consequence of the fact that governments
tend to have similar preferences as their parliaments or because ROs have a causal
effect on government opposition. While both mechanisms imply that ROs are infor-
mative signals for the Commission, future qualitative research could shed further
light on these dynamics.
We find that the Commission takes this signal seriously. Our results provide
compelling evidence that the Commission is more likely to withdraw its proposals
the more ROs are issued, whether or not they constitute a yellow card. A yellow
card is thus not a sufficient or necessary condition for the Commission to withdraw
a proposal. In addition, the Commission is more likely to withdraw when the costs
of policy adoption are high (UN voting), and the proposal is not very salient.
Moreover, our results have important implications that are less intuitive. A
more binding EWS, such as under the proposal for a red card, could upgrade
parliaments to a collective veto player in EU policymaking. However, adding
veto players may result in more legislative gridlock (Tsebelis, 2002) and hence
decrease the EU’s ability to legislate efficiently. Contrary to this logic, our results
suggest that the EWS in its current form may actually increase the efficiency of the
legislative process. While the Commission already holds pre-negotiations with
governments and, as such, selectively proposes policy that is supported widely,
NPs may in the end instruct their governments to oppose, even though the gov-
ernment has shown support in pre-consultations. As such, ROs can be considered
as an expanded form of pre-consultations. The Commission can then anticipate
bargaining difficulties in the Council and therefore save precious time and
resources.
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Notes
1. For the reader unfamiliar with this system, we summarize briefly: an RO from a unicam-
eral parliament counts as two votes against the Commission’s proposal, while an RO
coming from a chamber of a bicameral parliament counts as one vote. A yellow card is
triggered if one-third of all votes (19 out of 56 votes for the EU-28) are submitted in the
form of ROs. A yellow card is merely advisory, however, leaving it up to the Commission
to decide whether to maintain, amend, or withdraw the proposal (Cooper, 2015). In a
strict sense, parliaments thus lack collective veto power. As a result, it is not surprising
that the relevance of the EWS has been questioned from the outset (Raunio, 2010).
2. We focus on the 2010–2013 period because this is the longest period for which at least
90% of proposals have been concluded.
3. We are grateful to Keith Krehbiel for this suggestion. In the uncodified ‘Hold’ proce-
dure in the Senate, a majority backbencher asks the majority leader to hold a bill,
typically because of specific important interests of the backbencher’s constituents. In
the codified ‘Motion to recommit with instructions’, sometimes called ‘final shot’, the
House (typically the minority party) can send a bill back to the committee that drafted
it, just before it gets voted.
4. For studies on decision-making efficiency in the EU, see Crombez and Hix (2015),
Schulz and K€onig (2000) and van Gruisen (2019), for example.
5. In the Online appendix, we perform analyses on a subset of proposals (the consultation
procedure), where the EP cannot block legislation. We find that our conclusions hold
for this subset as well.
6. Note that this means that the Commission is already selective in proposing policy at this
stage: it refrains from submitting policy that does not satisfy pd c  0. This explains
why proposals often do not trigger much contestation, because the Commission would
not introduce them in the first place. As a result, the success rate of policy adoption is
relatively high. Nonetheless, the fact that a proportion of proposals eventually still get
withdrawn implies that the Commission has no perfect information.
7. For example, see Høyland and Hansen (2014) for a similar assumption on sincere
voting.
8. We performed several robustness checks with different coding schemes of the dependent
variable. The results are robust and can be found in the Online appendix.
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9. In our analysis, we do not consider later years as discussions are increasingly ongoing in
the Council for more recent proposals. For instance, the rate of ongoing proposals starts
exceeding 10% from 2014 onwards. As a robustness check, we ran regressions with our
time range expanded (þ2014) and reduced (–2013) by one year. The results are quali-
tatively the same.
10. One observation in our data was not straightforward to code and warrants extra expla-
nation: the proposal on the creation of European Public Prosecutor’s Office introduced
in 2013. This proposal received the second yellow card. Since this proposal was subject
to UN voting in the Council, it was clear that it would fail. However, because the
Commission allowed member states to approve it under the enhanced cooperation
procedure, the initial proposal was formally not withdrawn, although it clearly did
not pass under the original procedure. For that reason, we decided to code this proposal
as withdrawn. Similarly, member state governments that did not join the enhanced
cooperation were coded as if they abstained, even though in formal terms, they
simply did not participate. We decided to do so because there is a clear association
between those parliaments that issued an RO and governments that refrained from
joining the enhanced cooperation. Our results do not vary significantly depending on
the coding of this observation. The Online appendix presents regressions that exclude
this proposal.
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